Suchergebnisse

Manning examines issues of democratization and conflict resolution through the lens of the Mozambican experience from 1992-2000. Since the end of the Cold War, a formal democratization process has been at the center of virtually every negotiated peace agreement to end a civil conflict. Nearly a decade after the Rome peace accord put an end to 16 years of civil war, Mozambique stands out as one of the world's most unlikely postwar democratization success stories. What accounts for the durability of the postwar political settlement? What lessons does the Mozambican experience hold for other such.

Das Buch ist ein analytisch informierter Beitrag zum politischen Übergang vom Bürgerkrieg zu einem demokratisch organisierten Mehrparteiensystem in den 90er Jahren. Es geht mithin um die langfristigen Voraussetzungen der Friedensschaffung und -bewahrung und die Entwicklung einer nationalen politischen Kultur. Die Recherchen zu der Analyse erstreckten sich nahezu über den gesamten Zehnjahreszeitraum und legten ein besonderes Schwergewicht auf den Wandel der RENAMO von einer notorisch gewalttätigen Rebellenorganisation zu einer politischen Partei, die sich Wahlen unterwerfen und in ihnen bewähren muss. Dazu wurden Interviews mit über 70 RENAMO-Vertretern geführt. Das Buch versucht eine Antwort auf die Frage, warum der Zusammenhalt der RENAMO gewahrt werden und der Präsidentschaftskandidat Dhlakama in den Wahlen 1999 gegenüber 1994 sogar Stimmen hinzugewinnen konnte. (DÜI-Sbd)

How does development aid shape democracy after civil conflicts? I argue that political aid conditionalities and the economic utility that recipient elites gain from office give rise to a rent-seeking/democracy dilemma: recipients can initiate democratic reforms but also risk uncertainty over office and rents. Or they can refuse to implement such reforms, but risk losing aid rents if donors reduce aid flows in response to failed democratic reforms. This dilemma is strongest in power-sharing cabinets. By granting rebel groups temporally limited access to the state budget, such cabinets intensify elites' rent-seeking motives. Thus, aid-dependent power-sharing elites will hold cleaner elections, but also limit judicial independence and increase particularistic spending to simultaneously reap aid benefits and remain in power. I find statistical support for this argument using data on aid flows and power-sharing governments for all post-conflict states between 1990 and 2010.

How does development aid shape democracy after civil conflicts? I argue that political aid conditionalities and the economic utility that recipient elites gain from office give rise to a rent-seeking/democracy dilemma: recipients can initiate democratic reforms but also risk uncertainty over office and rents. Or they can refuse to implement such reforms, but risk losing aid rents if donors reduce aid flows in response to failed democratic reforms. This dilemma is strongest in power-sharing cabinets. By granting rebel groups temporally limited access to the state budget, such cabinets intensify elites' rent-seeking motives. Thus, aid-dependent power-sharing elites will hold cleaner elections, but also limit judicial independence and increase particularistic spending to simultaneously reap aid benefits and remain in power. I find statistical support for this argument using data on aid flows and power-sharing governments for all post-conflict states between 1990 and 2010.

Previous research has uncovered only ambiguous evidence of the mechanisms that support or inhibit democratic trajectories in the aftermath of civil war. Here I suggest that one specific form of transnational aid during a civil war may have reverberating consequences after the fighting stops. Specifically, when a state emerges to control the executive after a conflict with the help of a previous interstate enemy, the leadership is vulnerable to political attacks on their patriotism and judgment. As such, open democracy becomes a less attractive option for these executives. I investigate this proposition using difference-in-difference matching estimation, as well as several alternative specifications. The findings strongly suggest the presence of disincentives to democratize for those executives that received help from external rivals. This research provides a new set of tools for identifying the causes and potential remedies to deficient democracy after civil wars.

Since the 1980s, media assistance is often used as a tool in democratization processes and state building in post-conflict or fragile states. A number of international organizations, governmental, non-governmental, or inter-governmental, foundations and professional organizations are getting involved in assisting media to develop, while sending material and technical support, offering trainings but also getting involved in the establishment of regulatory bodies, and introducing media laws. This method is yet not well researched, and its effectiveness is under the question in academia as well as by practitioners in the field. In this thesis, I explore whether media assistance was an effective tool of democratization and state-building in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country that became semi-protectorate after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord. This thesis discuses if the imposition of the rules that regulate the media, can contribute to the process of democratization and state building, and look into how it affected professionalization of the media.The case of Bosnia is particularly indicative since it was one of the first and one of the biggest media assistance efforts, and some of the methods tested here have been transferred to other post-conflict countries, like Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq. ; Nidara Ahmetašević ; Graz, Univ., Diss., 2013 ; OeBB ; (VLID)892268

What impact does the way a civil war is terminated have on the post-conflict democratization process? This study analyses whether certain types of conflict termination are positive for post-conflict levels of democracy. It is argued that negotiated settlements, being at large more cooperative, are more conducive for democratization than truces or military victories. Stabilizing measures rarely leave possibilities for contestation of elites and thus few incentives to open up post-war society. The empirics reveal that negotiated settlements are the best way to end a conflict if democracy is to develop in its aftermath.

Does the institutional design of interim governments influence post-conflict democratization? Based on the logic of political engineering we examine whether designing interim regimes to incorporate inclusive representation of all warring parties, constraints on executive power, and decentralized governance enhances the prospects of post-conflict democratization. By analysing 15 interim regimes between 1989 and 2006, we find that while inclusiveness is not associated with democratization, executive constraints and decentralization are. These results point to the importance of establishing institutions that diffuse political power and reduce the zero-sum character of the political contest during transition. Adapted from the source document.